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erty he should be entitled to the benefit of his bargain. This rule
is applied when the seller fails to deliver the thing he has sold
or contracted to sellY Consistency requires that the same rule be
applied in the event of eviction.
MANDATE
Milton M. Harrison*
In Resweber v. Daspit' the court was confronted with the
narrow issue of whether a power of attorney to sell "all or any
part or parts of the real, personal, or mixed estate" of the man-
dator was sufficiently descriptive of the property to render valid
a sale by the mandatary. The question arises out of an interpre-
tation of Civil Code articles 2994, 2996, and 2997. A mandate "to
alienate . . .or give a mortgage, or do any other act of owner-
ship," must be express under Civil Code article 2996. Further-
more, article 2997 provides that "the power must be express and
special . .. to sell or to buy . .. ."
In the earlier cases of Rownd v. Davidso7n and Tensas Delta
Land Company v. Fletcher' the supreme court had held that
powers of attorney to sell all real estate in specified parishes were
sufficiently descriptive of the property. The instant case goes
one step farther in holding that a power to sell all of the real
estate of the mandator, without specifying the parish in which
it is located, is sufficiently descriptive. After discussing the his-
tory of articles 2996 and 2997 of the Civil Code and comparing
their language with the corresponding articles of the French
Civil Code,4 the court says that it is "aware that this holding in
effect strikes the word 'special' from Article 2997." 5
The courts are to be applauded for their decisions on this
issue. However, it would have been preferable if, instead of
focusing attention on the possible conflict between articles 2996
and 2997 and of striking the word "special" from article 2997,
the court had simply interpreted article 2994. Civil Code article
9. See Womack v. Sternberg, 247 La. 566, 172 So.2d 683 (1965); Rosenberg
v. Derbes, 165 La. 407, 115 So. 637 (1928); see also Eanes v. McKnight, 251
So.2d 491 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971). See Smith, Recovery of Damages for Non-
Delivery and Eviction in Lou4siana, 17 LA. L. Rxv. 253 (1957).
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2994 provides that the mandate "may be either general for all
affairs, or special for one affair only." Does this mean that a
mandate for more than one affair, but less than all, is neither
general nor special? Although article 2997 requires that the
power be express and special to "sell or buy," to "contract a loan
or acknowledge a debt," or to "draw or endorse bills of exchange
or promissory notes," it has never been seriously contended that
each transaction, other than those involving sale, must be speci-
fied. The counterpart of article 2994 in the French Civil Code6
provides that a special mandate is for one affair or certain affairs
only. Despite the omission of the phrase "or certain affairs" in
article 2994, this is the interpretation which should be given it,
thus removing the unintended possibility of having a mandate
which is neither general nor special and thereby giving meaning
to articles 2996 and 2997 without change.
The court in Krautkramer Ultrasonics, Inc. v. Port Allen
Marine Service, Inc.7 was called upon to determine the effect of
payment of a debt to a creditor's agent who was not authorized
to receive payment. In determining that the facts did not justify
finding that the principal had created apparent authority for the
agent to receive the payment and thereby discharged the debt
with reference to the creditor, the court took special notice of
the fact that the doctrine of apparent authority is not expressly
provided in the Louisiana Civil Code.8 However, the court pointed
out that the concept of apparent authority "is well embedded in
our jurisprudence." The latter statement is so true that the
courts have regularly applied the doctrine without even noting
the absence of codal authority therefor. It is hoped that the
supreme court will in the near future examine the place of ap-
parent authority in the law of Louisiana and provide clarity to
this issue.
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The supreme court held in the 1957 case of State v. Peterson'
6. FRENCH CiV. CODE art. 1987: "IZ est ou spdcial et pour une affatre ou
certaines affaires seuZement, ou gindral et pour toutes les affaires du man-
dant."
7. 248 So.2d 336 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), rehearing denied June 7, 1971.
8. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985-3034.
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